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SOCIALISM AND FEDERATION 
John N. Hazard* 
Federal structures are often established by national founders to manage 
intractable problems created over generations, if not centuries, by the mi-
gration of peoples.1 Military and economic pressures may stimulate union 
to assure survival, but ethnic, racial or religious tensions sometimes hamper 
draftsmen who sense the need for unity. Federation has often been the 
modem solution to the conflict between the need for unity and the desire 
for autonomy felt by groups fearing the loss of identity. 
Federation has taken no standard form. Federal architects have con-
structed models incorporating varying degrees of unity and autonomy, de-
pending upon their perception of the strength of competing pressures. If 
the pressure for unity is great because of fear of invasion or economic col-
lapse, the balance of power is given to a central government. On the other 
hand, if the pressures for autonomy are great and can be accommodated 
without threatening the survival of the new state, the founders create a 
loose union. The dominant concerns among those who have chosen federal 
. structures of government have been pragmatic rather than ideological, al-
though in recent times ideology has been brought to the support of federal 
structure. For example, reformers in post-World War II Germany estab-
lished a federal structure in the expectation that it would encourage the 
development of democratic procedures from the grass roots level up.2 
Some legal theorists are now asking what impact socialist ideology has 
had on the law. One of the greatest, Wolfgang Friedmann, wrote two de-
cades ago that "despite many differences between Soviet and other legal 
systems, no basically new concepts or legal relationships have developed."3 
The exploration of this thesis, as it may apply to federal structures, is partic-
ularly appropriate in a paper written to honor Eric Stein, who has con-
cerned himself with the comparison of laws and notably with the study of 
federations. The exploration is made even more tempting by the fact that 
the Friedmann thesis is at such odds with the claims socialist jurists have 
made as to the novelty of their federal structures. One of the early writers 
on Soviet federation wrote in the late 1920's that it was impossible to use 
bourgeois theories to describe the Soviet federation because it was of a new 
* Nash Professor Emeritus of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1930, Yale University; 
LL.B 1934, Harvard University; Ctf. 1937, Moscow Juridical Institute; J.S.D. 1939, University 
of Chicago. - Ed. 
I. For motivation of drafters of federal constitutions, see E. McWHINNEY, CONSTITUTION 
MAKING: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, PRACTICE 75-80 (1981). 
2. For the thinking of the occupying powers on restructuring Germany, see Loewenstein, 
Political Reconstruction in Germany, Zonal and lnterzonal, in CHANGE AND CRISIS IN EURO• 
PEAN GOVERNMENT 29-43 (J. Pollock ed. 1947). 
3. W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (1959). 
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type.4 The constituent states had not, in his view, lost their sovereignty by 
entering the federation. The first federal constitution reflected this position, 
by declaring in article 3 that each constituent republic preserved its sover-
eignty, and in article 4 that each had the consequent right to secede from 
the federation.5 
This early position has been maintained by Soviet authors over the 
years. Indeed, it has been stated with greater emphasis: ''The Soviet feder-
ation is a federation of a new, superior type, differing in principle from a 
bourgeois federation."6 The claim is made because the Soviet federation is 
deemed to be a ''voluntary union of socialist republics constructed on the 
base of the dictatorship of the working class."7 More recently, the Soviet 
member of the International Association of Legal Science, Viktor M. 
Tchikvadze, has said at a round table devoted to federalism that "[t]he con-
struction of the Soviet union state was a creative revolutionary pro-
cess. . . . There has never existed a federation in history . . . as vital as 
the USSR .... " 8 
What does the record show? Does it support the claims being made for 
structural novelty because of the presence of socialist thought in the minds 
of those who founded socialist-oriented federations? Since the prototype of 
the socialist federation has been the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
our focus will be upon it. Fortunately, Viktor Knapp in this testimonial 
volume gives his evaluation of socialist federalism as it has emerged in his 
native Czechoslovakia, in Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union. Readers 
may thus compare the socialist-inspired federations and assess the evalua-
tions made by authors looking at the socialist world both from the inside 
and the outside. 
Tchikvadze in his 1970 paper concluded that the "[t]he fraternal cooper-
ation of the soviet republics in military and economic fields paved the way 
for their uniting in the Union of the S.S.R."9 This suggests the presence of 
classic pressures for creation of the first socialist federation. The documents 
bear out this suggestion, for they indicate that the pressure for unification 
came both from fear of invasion by hostile neighbors and fear of economic 
collapse following the devastation of World War I and the subsequent civil 
war in what had been the Russian Empire. 10 In this sense the genesis of the 
4. See Cheliapov, Federatsiia [Federation], in 3 ENTSIKLOPEDIIA GosUDARSTVA I PRAVA 
[Encyclopedia of State and Law] 1413-17 (P. Stuchka ed. 1925-1927). 
5. For an English translation of texts of Soviet constitutions, see A. UNGER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR: A GUIDE TO THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONS {1981). 
6. See Federatsiia [Federation], in 2 IURIDICHESK.11 SLOVAR' [Juridicial Dictionary] 572-77 
(P. Kudriavtsev ed. 1956). 
7. Id. 
8. Tchikvadze, Soviet Federalism and the Development of the Legal System in the USSR, in 
INTL~ ASSN. OF LEGAL SCIENCES, FEDERALISM AND DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 145, 
149, 167 (1971). 
9. Id. at 149. 
10. The documents have been collected in ACADEMIIA NAUK S.S.S.R., INSTITUT SoVET-
SKOGO STROITEL'STVA I PRAVA, ISTORIIA SOVETSKOI KONSTITUTSII V DEKRETAKH I POSTA· 
NOVLENIIAKH SoVETSKOGO PRAVITEL'STVA 1917-1936 [Academy of Science of the USSR, 
Institute of Soviet Structure and Law, History of the Soviet Constitution in Decrees and Reso-
lutions of the Soviet Government 1917-1936] 99-250 (S. Studentkin ed. 1936 & photo. reprint 
1963). 
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Soviet federation of late December 1922 seems to have been traditionally 
motivated. Can one conclude, however, that the genesis was also in some 
way affected by the founders' commitment to socialism? If so, one might 
conclude that socialism had introduced a new element into the formation of 
federations. 
I. THE IMPACT OF LENIN 
V.I. Lenin was, of course, the principal founder of the USSR, and his 
life provides a key to understanding the motives of those who gathered to 
create the USSR on that late December day of 1922. He had proved him-
self to be both ideologically oriented and pragmatic, not only in his writings 
but in his actions both before and after the Russian revolution of 1917. In 
general, he was not one to put aside socialist theory under pressures created 
by facts. To be sure, he showed himself willing to compromise on socialist 
theory to survive in the face of hostile pressures, but he seems never to have 
lost sight of his goal. He could bring himself to introduce a "New Eco-
nomic Policy" (N.E.P.) in 1921 to aid in restoring an ailing economy even 
though it released capitalist forces from the socialist-inspired restraints cre-
ated in 1917. His willingness to abandon his plans for the future was re-
vealed during the first years of an era known to history as that of "war 
communism," when he sought to introduce a system of government that 
would be popular, simple in structure, and designed soon to ''wither away" 
when no longer needed to restrain hostile forces carried over from the im-
perial period. 11 The N.E.P. was described as a step backward until the 
march toward socialism could be resumed. 
The federation was formed in late 1922 a few months after the introduc-
tion of the N.E.P. In a sense the two innovations went together, although 
federation was motivated by more than a sense of need for revival. It was 
rooted in political theory as an extrapolation of Lenin's pre-revolutionary 
slogan of "self-determination of peoples." 12 Lenin had proclaimed his slo-
gan in hope of gaining support for the revolution from the non-Russian 
peoples of the Empire by catering to their century-long desire to be free of 
the Tsar' s policy of Russification. Self-determination was, therefore, a tac-
tic in the struggle with Tsarism. 
After victory in the "October Revolution," Lenin demonstrated his 
sense that promises had to be kept if he was to remain credible. He signed 
decrees authorizing the Finns, the Bielorussians, the Ukrainians and the 
Baltic peoples to secede from the unitary state that had been the Russian 
Empire, 13 but his goal was not the permanent breakup of Imperial unity. 
Lenin's goal was reunification with the Russian core in a structure he called 
11. V.I. Lenin's plans for the future, as drafted before the revolution, were stated by him in 
his STATE AND REVOLUTION (1917). The speed with which the state is currently expec~d to 
wither has been slowed since Lenin's time. ''The state as an organization embracing the entire 
people will survive until the complete victory of co=unism." For an English translation, see 
SOVIET COMMUNISM: PROGRAMS AND RULES 23, 98 (J. Triska ed. 1962) (translation of the 
1961 Progra=e of the Co=unist Party of the Soviet Union). 
12. Lenin expressed his view of self-determination in an article published in 1914. For an 
English translation, see his On the Right of Nations to Se!f-determination, in 4 V.I. LENIN, 
SELECTED WORKS 249-93 (1943). 
13. For the view that Lenin envisaged the break-away of national groups as only a transi-
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the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Although "fed-
erated" in name, it followed no Western model. No structure other than a 
People's Commissariat of Nationalities was to give the minority peoples a 
voice through which to express their desires to the dominating Russians. 
There was to be no second chamber in which deputies would have equal 
representation with the Russians, nor was there to be a right to secede. 
Lenin showed his colors as a unifier even more prominently in reaffirm-
ing his long-standing attitude toward the structure of his Communist 
Party.14 Before the Russian revolution, when the Party was given the task 
of organizing for revolution, Lenin had established the rule of unity within 
the Party, even though some colleagues demanded recognition of ethnic 
differences through grants of autonomy. Lenin's position was inspired by 
the Communist Man!festo of 1848 in which Marx and Engels had stated 
categorically that "workingmen have no country."15 Consequently, when 
his Jewish party comrades expressed a desire to create a separate Jewish 
revolutionary organization, the "Bund," Lenin insisted that there was no 
reason for an autonomous unit. All communists were expected to put aside 
their ethnic origin and their nationalist sentiments when enlisting under the 
working class banner. In the future the binding tie was to be but "class," 
and the strong nationalist currents on which Lenin was prepared to rely in 
dismembering the Empire were to have no recognition among communists. 
Lenin reasserted his unification creed in 1915 in opposition to the Social 
Democrats, who had not objected to the entrance of their respective govern-
ments into the world war. Lenin perceived votes for the budgets necessary 
to pay for the war as betrayals of socialist faith. His response was to disa-
vow the Second Socialist International and to initiate steps to create a new 
International eventually to be known as the Third or Communist Interna-
tional. Its mission would be to spread the experience of the Russian revolu-
tion around the world.16 
With this creed of working class solidarity deeply implanted in commu-
nists tutored by Lenin during the long struggle for victory over the Tsar, the 
Finns, Bielorussians, Ukrainians, and Baltic peoples were expected to rejoin 
the Russians in the RSFSR when the rationality of union became evident to 
the masses in general. In short, reunion was expected to become popular 
when the military and economic perils of attempting to survive as small 
states had become so universally obvious that, in spite of tradition, most 
minority peoples would accept leadership from communists toward reunifi-
cation with the Russians. 
Lenin's expectations were not to be disappointed. Several of the minor-
ity peoples returned under communist leadership, but the structure chosen 
tional stage on the road to reintegration under socialism, see L. SCHAPIRO, THE COMMUNIST 
PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION 149 (1960). 
14. Id.. 
15. K. MARX & F. ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ch. II, para. 53 (au-
thorized English trans. New York 1933) (1st ed. London 1848). 
16. For an English translation of Lenin's report on a meeting of revolutionaries in Berne, 
see his Conference of the Sections of the RS.D.LP. Abroad, in 5 V.I. LENIN, SELECTED WoRKS 
131-37 (1943). The Zimmerwald Conference in the autumn of 1915 is chronicled by a Soviet 
historian. See P. KERZHENSTEV, LIFE OF LENIN 157 (1937). 
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for reunification was not the RSFSR. Lenin apparently realized that even 
his "federation" smacked of Russian domination, and he conceived the idea 
of a new type of federation with more trappings of autonomy for minorities, 
namely the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 17 
From what transpired at the founding congress of representatives from 
the previously independent republics joining together in the new USSR, it 
appears that Lenin had his eye on more than reunification of what had been 
the component parts of the Empire. He looked toward Asia and eventually 
the world. One of the delegates from his Third International rose on the 
floor of the congress to shout "Long live the USSR of the World." 
Many minds perceived the new structure as a blueprint designed to at-
tract like-minded peoples with hopes in socialism. It was not seen as a per-
manent structure, of course, for the theorists seem always to have kept in 
mind the evolution of a society knowing no traditional state forms. Frater-
nal peoples were expected eventually to join in an ill-defined unitary struc-
ture of worldwide dimensions. That structure would facilitate economic 
administration with no need to maintain an apparatus of compulsion to 
restrain dissatisfied recalcitrant peoples. It would be what Marx and Engels 
had called a nonstate, an "administration of things." Its remarkable inno-
vation would be the total absence of police, prosecutors, courts, jailers and 
even of professional administrators. It would bind together the peoples of 
the world in a "self-administered" society. 
This was the dream of 1922, a dream not yet officially discarded from 
textbooks proclaiming a goal of self-determination and the ultimate conver-
gence of peoples. While the worldwide aspirations are muted today, first 
steps have been taken within the USSR to speed convergence of peoples by 
encouraging the subordination of national sentiments within a concept 
known as "Soviet man." 
II. THE IMPACT OF PLANNING ON FEDERATION 
Lenin's federal structure must be seen as a compromise between ideal-
ism and pragmatism. It is a compromise that remains in place in the mid-
1980's, although redefined to some degree in the two federal constitutions 
that have been promulgated since the original. 18 Still, in spite of this con-
tinuity of structure, there have been challenges, the most vigorous coming 
from the economic planners. This might have been expected, for socialists 
have long said that their major contribution to mankind's welfare is eco-
nomic planning, from which they expect abundance eventually to flow. 
Their faith is demonstrated by the slogan "the plan is law," and at times 
administrators who have deviated from the plan have been prosecuted. 
The planners' challenge to federalism has been straightforward. It is 
simply that federalism in the Soviet model is not economically rational. 
17. Lenin's thoughts on abandoning the RSFSR as the unit to which the Ukraine and 
other republics would return in favor of a broader concept of a USSR in which the RSFSR 
would share equally with the other republics, were set forth in a letter to L.B. Kamenev dated 
September 26, 1922. For text see Document No. IOI in OBRAZ0VANIE SOIUZA SOVETSKIKH 
SoTSIALlSTlCHESKlKH REsPUBUK: SB0RNIK DoKUMENT0V [The Formation of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics: Collection of Documents] 297 (1972). 
18. See generally A. UNGER, supra note 5. 
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The fact that in the great migrations of the past the Ukrainians had come 
by chance to rest where they are, with distinctly different peoples as neigh-
bors, living in what planners define as the same "economic watershed," was 
thought to be no reason to refuse to integrate factories and farms located 
across republic boundaries but needing one another for economic viability. 
Planners since the 1920's have asked Communist Party officials whether 
they might disregard ethnic boundaries, but the answer has always been 
"No." The rationale for maintenance of an ethnically organized federal 
structure seems still to be compelling despite highly touted campaigns to 
develop an homogenized "Soviet man." 
Although the federation is preserved with ethnic dividing lines, pres-
sures for economic rationalization continue to be accommodated. This oc-
curs in the structure of economic ministries. Since 1922 there have been 
three types of ministries: the all-union, the union-republic and the repub-
lic.19 As originally conceived, the supremely important heavy industries, 
on which Stalin relied for development of the economy, would be directed 
by the federal government's ministry without regard to any desires of ethnic 
minorities in the republics to share in policymaking, as expressed through 
their Councils of Ministers. The less critical, although important, light in-
dustries, catering to the differing tastes created by geographical location or 
ethnic tradition, would be directed by administrators required to look .for 
guidance in two directions: upward to the federal government for general 
planning and sideways to their republic legislature and Council of Minis-
ters for direction in executing the plan in conformity with regional needs. 
A third type, denominated the "republic type," would permit the local 
soviets, as representatives of the peoples of a republic, to create industries in 
their midst to draw upon local resources capable of meeting distinctly local 
needs and requiring no direction from above, except that provided by the 
vague indicative plan for local industry. 
For all but two years - when Nikita Khrushchev departed from cen-
tralized ministerial control over heavy and light industry to shift the bal-
ance of administrative direction to locally oriented economic councils -
the three-type structure of economic ministries has prevailed. Occasionally 
one or another industry, for example ferrous metallurgy, has been trans-
ferred from one category of ministerial structure to another, but the funda-
mental pattern remains. 
Khrushchev tried another experiment to alter the balance between eth-
nic units and centrally directed planning. His scheme called for grouping 
small republics together into economic planning regions. This reduced the 
likelihood that local officials would attempt to retain for their own ethnic 
group raw materials in short supply. As with his economic councils, 
Khrushchev's regional groupings of republics did not outlast his ouster in 
1964 by colleagues determined to restore what had come to be traditional 
structures. 
19. Article 50 of the first Soviet Constitution established the first two types in the federal 
system. The third type was established by the constitutions of the various republics. A. UN-
GER, supra note 5. 
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III. TAXATION, BUDGET AND FEDERATION 
Planning inherently requires taxation and budgeting to obtain and dis-
burse funds to implement the plans. The impact of socialism upon federal 
structure is, therefore, as evident in this financial activity as it is in plan-
ning. The constituent members of the federation have no funds available to 
them for their distribution without regard to the provisions of the federal 
plan.20 The manner of collection of taxes may suggest otherwise, for finan-
cial officers in each republic collect the taxes, but the tax rates and the dis-
tribution system are set by the federal budget law. While the republic 
authorities may hold for use within the republic those funds authorized by 
the federal law, they must remit the balance to the federal government. 
In the interest of efficiency, and also to meet halfway the special desires 
of the peoples of a republic as expressed through the republic's legislature 
in its budget law, the sums allocated in the federal budget to a republic are 
established in gross only. The republic's budget law then distributes the 
sums allocated by categories in the federal budget to the specific units to be 
financed. The system is designed to accommodate both the traditional so-
cialist ·goal of community welfare of the nation as a whole and the local 
pressures and preferences within the federal structure. 
IV. CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
Socialism claims for itself not only economic rationality, as provided 
through national economic planning, but also advantages in mass cultural 
development. Its boast is that it serves the individual through the welfare of 
the entire community. Because many of the ethnic groups inhabiting the 
fringe regions of the USSR were illiterate and, therefore, unprepared to 
improve their lot after the revolution, the literate peoples at the core saw as 
one of their primary tasks the elevation of cultures of all peoples, especially 
those who were illiterate. Resources available only at the core were drawn 
upon to finance and direct the evolution of small cultural units. The federal 
government assumed the role of guardian over wards. 
"Dirigisme," as the French have called the interventionist attitude of 
leaders at the core, became the hallmark of the soviet type of socialism as it 
has emerged in the USSR. One may argue that this aspect of the Soviet 
federation owes nothing to socialist thought in conception, since other fed-
erations have used resources from the federal treasury to contribute to the 
cultural development of peoples less advantaged than those at the core. 
Even the United States has long used a graduated federal tax system, the 
revenues of which are in part used for the cultural benefit of peoples in less 
populated states lacking in financial resources. 
Outsiders find it difficult to draw a line between the concern for brothers 
in need shown by an individualistic society and the obligation sensed in a 
collectivist society to meet similar needs. Are the two comparable? To the 
socialists the commitment of the collectivist is seen as firmer and broader 
than that of the humanistic individualist caring for a disadvantaged fellow 
citizen. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that traditionally there has been 
20. For a summary of Soviet tax structure, see A. NOVE, THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
230-37 (1977). 
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a contrast between intervention by the federal government in cultural poli-
cies of the states in the United States and intervention in the cultural poli-
cies of republics by the federal government in the USSR. Not only does the 
USSR's federal government provide massive financing of the arts and edu-
cation in the fringe areas, but it also directs curricula, chooses textbooks 
and specifies qualifications of teachers in the schools.21 
Some of the interventionism evidenced by the Soviet Government is 
probably engendered by a desire to prevent emergence of nationalist fervor 
eventually likely to stimulate challenge to the central government. Yet, it 
may well be that some nationalism is stimulated by the socialist goal of 
convergence of peoples. Unless educational programs are structured to cre-
ate a unity of outlook, the diversity of peoples may again emerge to cause 
disunity in line with the world-wide rebirth of nationalist movements. So-
viet frontiers, although well protected, cannot separate totally the peoples of 
Central Asia from their Moslem coreligionists to the south.22 This may 
explain why original patterns calling for control over education by repub-
lics have been shifted by degrees to the federal government. Ministries con-
cerned with education and justice have been transferred from the republic 
to the union-republic type of ministry. 
V. SOCIALISM AND CODES OF LAW 
In no place has duality of control between federal and republic govern-
ment been indicated so clearly as in the structure of codes oflaw. As legally 
independent republics before federation, the various ethnically defined re-
publics of the early years promulgated their own codes of law. The record 
shows much similarity among the various republics' codes, because commu-
nists at the helm of each coordinated their thinking with that of the jurists 
of the RSFSR in expectation of ultimate union with the core republic. 
When federation was accomplished without absorption into the RSFSR, 
each constituent republic kept its own codes, although the new federal con-
stitution provided for coordination of thought more formally than through 
meetings of jurists. The new constitution authorized the federal legislature 
to establish "fundamentals" of law to which republic codes were to be re-
quired to conform.23 Such fundamentals were enacted slowly, but by de-
grees they were spread across the board, and republic codes were made to 
conform to the extent that they had departed from a federal norm. 
Finally, in the second federal constitution of 1936 it was ordered that 
the republic codes be replaced totally by new federal codes of law.24 Al-
though three drafts were prepared, they were never promulgated, allegedly 
because Stalin preferred to operate through separate normative acts easily 
recognized as superior to the republics' codes. The constitution was 
21. For the structure and policies of the Soviet educational system, see J. ZAJDA, EDUCA-
TION 1N THE USSR (1980). 
22. For analysis of the impact of Islamic trends on the Central Asian republics of the 
USSR, see M. RYWKIN, Moscow's MUSLIM CHALLENGE: SOVIET CENTRAL AsIA (1982). 
23. USSR CONST. OF 1924, art. l(o), reprinted in A. UNGER, supra note 5, at 61. 
24. See USSR CONST. OF 1936, art. 14 (u), reprinted in A. UNGER, supra note 5, at 142. 0. 
Ioffe, a participant in the drafting process of all-union codes, has set forth his thoughts on why 
it failed in 0. IOFFE & P. MAGGS, SOVIET LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 94 (1983). 
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amended in 1957 after Stalin's death to restore the structures of the first 
federal constitution, and the restored structure has remained in place to the 
present day. 
Conformity has, however, been advanced by virtue of the fact that fed-
eral fundamentals were promulgated during the Brezhnev era of the 1970's 
not only in the principal branches of law but also in previously untouched 
areas.25 Additionally, conformity was fostered by assembling in Moscow 
groups of jurists from the republics, before the enactment of new codes by 
the republics. Little variation is now left except in the designation of penal-
ties for similarly defined crimes and in statutes of limitations for civil 
actions. 
In spite of this trend toward uniformity, the codes contain rules to be 
applied in the event of conflict of laws.26 But their applicability changes 
little in the way a crime or the status of a citizen is treated. Variations are 
not to be compared with those existing between states of the United States 
or of Australia, or between the provinces of Canada. 
The outsider may ask whether socialism is actually responsible for these 
trends, toward. unification, since similar trends have been seen in the 
Benelux.countries and in the Nordic Conference, where socialism plays no 
part in pressures for unification. A clue may be found in the arguments of a 
Ukrainian scholar who has written about what he sees happening in inter-
national public and private law.27 He writes that the existence of socialist 
principles has brought the legal systems of the Eastern European socialist 
states closer together and he expects the trend to become manifest in states 
of socialist orientation in the Third World, and even elsewhere, as eco-
nomic structures become somewhat similar. He looks at spreading nation-
alizations of productive property and at state, national and international 
economic planning. Perhaps the conclusion is justified that, while the 
Benelux countries or the Nordic Conference may seek unity as a matter of 
administrative convenience, the socialist states see it as imperative for doc-
trinal reasons, as well as for enhancement of the rationality of planning and 
the intermingling of citizens in marriage and employment. 
VI. FEDERAL VS. REPUBLIC COURTS 
In establishing their court system, the founders of the Soviet federation 
faced a problem that is familiar to other federations. It is the one to which 
James Madison gave his attention in Philadelphia; namely, need there be a 
system of inferior federal courts for some purposes, or may all litigated 
25. These have been published in English translation as LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF THE USSR 
(2 vols. 1980 and 1982). 
26. See, e.g., Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR and Union Repub-
lics, Act of Dec. 8, 1961, art. 18; Fundamental Principles of Criminal Legislation of the USSR 
and Union Republics, Act of Dec. 25, 1958, art. 4; Fundamental Principles of Legislation of 
the USSR and Union Republics on Marriage and the Family, Act of June 27, 1968, art. 8, 
reprinted in COLUMBIA UNIV. PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW, THE 
SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM: LEGISLATION AND DOCUMENTATION 399, 661, 453 (W. Butler trans. 
1978). 
27. See V. BUTKEVICH, SOOTNOSHENIE VNUTRIGOSUDARSTVENNOGO 1 
MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA [The Interrelationship of Internal and International Law] 276-77 
(1981). 
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matters go before the courts of the constituent states of the federation? 
Since the federation in the USSR was to unite republics that had been in-
dependent for several years and thus had created their own court systems, 
the federal architects would have had to uproot several established systems 
had they moved in the direction of total unification of courts under the 
federal flag. 
The record shows that the decision went against upheaval, probably be-
cause the courts were close to culture, and at the time any attempt at unifi-
cation in a federal system might have been interpreted by the minority 
peoples as reversion to Russification. In any event, the courts of the various 
republics were left in place, although topped by a new federal Supreme 
Court to perform the function, traditional in all federations, of providing 
unity in interpretation of the federal constitution.28 
This left for decision the matter of creating some inferior federal courts 
to share jurisdiction in some manner with the courts of the republics. Mod-
els vary in their resolution of this question. The Indian drafters saw no 
need for inferior federal courts. Our founders in Philadelphia left the mat-
ter open for resolution by the federal Congress, and its members saw fit to 
create such courts, notably to lessen the likelihood of disputes with foreign 
states or between states of the federation who might conclude that their 
citizens were disadvantaged in the courts of a sister state. ' 
Concerns like those in the United States seem to have been absent from 
Soviet minds as court structures were created, but inferior federal courts 
emerged nevertheless. The record indicates that the major anticipated 
problem was state security, for the courts created on the federal side were 
concerned with the critical areas of communication by transport, whether 
by water or on land, and military security.29 All of these courts were made 
responsible to the federal Supreme Court to which there was a right of 
cassational appeal. In 1934 the security courts were supplemented by an 
administrative tribunal within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These "Spe-
cial Boards" were authorized to exile to work camps for terms-of up to five 
years persons deemed by the tribunal to be "socially dangerous."30 Natu-
rally, this federal administrative tribunal was not required to follow the 
republic codes of criminal law and criminal procedure. 
The inferior federal courts were reduced in number following the re-
structuring of the federal institutions by the second federal constitution of 
1936. The railroad and water transport courts were abolished, and the mili-
tary tribunal was limited in jurisdiction to actions concerning military per-
sonnel and prosecutions for espionage against civilians or military 
personnel. Finally, after Stalin's death in 1953 the Special Boards were 
abolished to leave the military tribunals in their new guise as the sole infer-
ior federal courts. 31 
28. For a history of the development of the judicial system, see J. HAzARD, SETTLING 
DISPUTES IN SOVIET SOCIETY 199-204 {1960). 
29. These special courts as they existed at the time are described in A. VYSHINSKY, THE 
LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE 523-24 (1948). 
30. Decree of July 19, 1934, [1934] I Sob. Zak. SSSR No. 36, Item 283; Decree of Nov. 5, 
1934, [1935] I Sob. Zak. SSSR No. 55, Item 84. 
31. The decree of abolition was not published at the time but was revealed in articles by 
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Socialism seems to have no part to play in the division of competence 
between federal and republic courts, unless it be argued that the sacrifices 
demanded of citizens during the period when traditional ways of con-
ducting private enterprise are being replaced by state enterprise intensify 
dangers to state security. To be sure, social revolutions have always stimu-
lated strong opposition from those driven from power, and for a period of 
years security of the state has been of paramount concern. The introduc-
tion of socialist limitations on private ownership may conceivably have 
multiplied the number of citizens intent upon unseating socialist-minded 
leaders, but the relationship between socialism and the establishment of 
federal courts for security purposes is tenuous. 
VII. SOCIALISM AND THE LEGISLATURE 
Lenin's determination to eliminate ethnic loyalties as an influence upon 
state structure was reflected in the RSFSR's constitution of 1918. He made 
its legislature mµcameral with deputies distributed on the basis of popula-
tion alone. No second chamber for the minority peoples brought within the 
Russian Federation was established. The concerns of minority peoples 
were to be met through the Ministry of Nationalities. Thus, the legislature 
stood as testimony to the fact that the focal point in the representational 
system was "class" and not ethnicity. 
When the federation was restructured as the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, Lenin authorized a compromise of sorts with the ethnic groups 
being rejoined to the Russians. The legislature was to remain a class legis-
lature in that it excluded those not classified as ''workers or peasants," and 
it was to include no second chamber to represent ethnic groups. There was, 
however, an interim body created to sit during the long intervals between 
meetings of the unicameral Congress of Soviets. This interim body, bearing 
the anomalous title "Central Executive Committee" in spite of being a pol-
icy-making and not an executive organ, was to be bicameral.32 Representa-
tion in one of its two chambers was to be accorded to ethnic units on the 
basis of equality for the four constituent republics despite great differences 
in population. Even the smaller ethnic units within the RSFSR and the 
Transcaucasian Republic were to have representation, although with fewer 
deputies for those denominated "autonomous territories." 
In structuring the legislature in this manner, Lenin followed generally 
the pattern in use in other federations where the constituent units are pro-
vided representation in a separate chamber. Unlike the United States, 
other federations have not found it necessary or desirable to represent all 
units equally,33 but all find that federation suggests that representation shall 
not be solely on the basis of population. 
Socialist thought in its Marxist variant can have played no part in the 
creation of the bicameral interim legislature, for a bicameral legislature 
law professors. For an account of the revelations, see Berman, Law Reform in the Soviet 
Union, 15 AM. SLAVIC & E. EUR. REv. 179, 183-85 (1956). 
32. USSR CONST. OF 1924, arts. 8, 13-36, reprinted in A. UNGER, supra note 5, at 62-65. 
33. For a concise summary of legislative structure in Australia, Canada, the Federal Re-
public of Germany and Switzerland, see Bowie, The Federal Legislature, in STUDIES IN FED• 
ERALISM 3, 29-55 (R. Bowie & C. Friedrich eds. 1954). 
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based in part on representation of ethnic units rather than class unity could 
not have been countenanced, at least in doctrine, by the authors of the Com-
munist Manifesto. Bicameralism can be seen only as a compromise, whose 
sharp edge was dulled to some extent by article 28 of the 1924 constitution, 
which declared "The Central Executive Committee of the Union shall be 
responsible to the Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics."34 In theory, at least, this clause gave class representation priority 
over ethnic representation at the highest level. 
Even this token adherence to the Manifesto's principle vanished from 
the second federal constitution of 1936, and it has not reemerged with the 
promulgation of the subsequent constitution of 1977. The drafters of 1936 
discontinued the Congress of Soviets and raised to the supreme legislative 
level the bicameral Central Executive Committee, entitling it the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics' Supreme Soviet. Recognition of ethnicity had 
triumphed over class, albeit not without some obeisance to purist thinkers 
on the educational front. The Communist Party has intensified its cam-
paign against ethnic loyalties and preached in an ever louder voice the ulti-
mate convergence of all ethnic groups into a single group to be populated 
by homogenized Soviet men and women. · 
CONCLUSION 
The pragmatists of the common law systems are prone to conclude that 
expediency has triumphed across the board over ideology in the sixty-odd 
years of Soviet history. The record concerning the legislature and the judi-
ciary, and the system of law codes, certainly supports such a conclusion. 
The evidence from the administrative structure is not so clear in its implica-
tions, but it appears that what is expedient in administration conforms in 
some measure to what Marxist ideology would indicate as desirable. 
The distribution of administrative functions among the three types of 
ministries engaged in production has been based generally upon centralist 
motivation. Ethnicity is taken into consideration only when the satisfaction 
of consumer desires requires it. Industries are moved back and forth from 
one type of ministerial structure to another without regard to ethnic sensi-
bilities. Only in the field of culture is there evidence of perception of a need 
to preserve policymaking within the republics, and even in this sphere poli-
cymaking has been passed increasingly to the central government, as with 
education and the administration of justice. 
The haunting presence of ideological considerations in Soviet political 
literature and, seemingly, in the minds of Soviet jurists makes the common 
lawyer with his or her lack of concern for ideology wonder whether a con-
clusion is justified that socialist thought today plays no part in the creation 
and maintenance of federal structures. The experience of 1928, when the 
concessions to private enterprise represented by the N.E.P. were dropped, 
suggests that what may look like a permanent concession to ethnicity in the 
form of a federal rather than a unitary state is no more than a concession, 
perhaps of long duration but a concession nevertheless. The literature on 
"convergence of peoples," on the creation of a new homogenized Soviet 
34. USSR CONST. OF 1924, art. 28, reprinted in A. UNGER, supra note 5, at 65. 
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man, and on preservation of a working class base for a Soviet state (now 
explained as including the ''whole people" (since no bourgeois elements re-
main), suggests that early goals have not been forgotten. If this be so, so-
cialist concepts of the unity of peoples under the banner of class may 
eventually triumph over the concessions of today. 
The arresting thought must linger in the subconsciousness of those who 
know Marxist tenets that with the achievement of communism there can be 
no state at all, whether federal or unitary. Marx and Engels told their disci-
ples that the need for the state as an apparatus of compulsion would pass. 
The state would ''wither away." To the non-Marxist such an expectation is 
utopian, an impossibility, or at least so remote as to be beyond the concern 
of those who try to manage the problems of these times. 
For those who adhere to such a view, this paper must end inconclu-
sively, but for those whose courage is supported by dreams of the good 
society, socialism provides the hope by which they live. Such persons can-
not be expected to abandon efforts to achieve this dream. , 
